Indeed, the paper suggests that the same institutions that have aggressively convicted corrupt officials under some governments have entered into plea discussions under others, a fact which highlights that government transitions have serious effects on the conduct of supposedly independent anti-corruption mechanisms.
Comparative political studies portray full democracy as a cure for extremism (Brooks 2009), bad governance (Stockemer 2009) and corruption (Rock 2009).
Yet in the case of Pakistan, many authors have considered the army an impediment to rather than a facilitator of the development of democracy (Shah 2014) and a supporter of Islamic extremism (Nasr 2004).
After a decade during which elected governments were regularly dismissed on grounds of corruption, Pakistan and its anti-corruption agencies have been overseen by four distinct governments since 1999.
First, the state came under direct military rule on October 12, 1999 when General Musharraf overthrew the elected government of Nawaz Sharif, initiating a period of “military regime.” Second, a transition from direct to indirect military rule took place in October 2002 when the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), under the patronage of the army, emerged as the majority party in the general elections and ruled the country for the next five years.
the Ehtesab Cell (EC), was established by the November 1996 Ehtesab Ordinance promulgated by the caretaker government of Prime Minister Malik Meraj Khalid, and then operated under the elected government of Nawaz Sharif, who passed the Ehtesab Act, 1997.
In November 1999, it was transformed by the National Accountability Ordinance into the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), after General Pervez Musharraf staged a military coup and proclaimed that his government would subject politicians and administrators to “ruthless” accountability (Musharraf 200).
The army has used anti-corruption agencies to hold civilian politicians accountable, while the sitting government has used them against political parties in the opposition.
Finally, the paper concludes that a high level of political animosity results in a high level of performance for accountability institutions.
No state has thus developed truly independent institutions—institutions operating without any concern for the interests and concerns of the key members of the government (Collins 2011).
Yet, some political systems are quite clearly far more politicized than others.