Among the initiatives undertaken by the new government were measures to end foreign monopoly control of Iraq's oil resources. 10] But in November, Iranian Propaganda Director Bahram Shahrokh stopped Voice of America (VOA) as well as BBC relays on Radio Tehran, saying that his predecessor had been too friendly to foreign powers.(10) In December, Iran's prime minister told the American embassy that he expected Shahrokh to retain his position for some time. embassy and USIS developed propaganda accentuating "popular support" for the shah "as demonstrated by [the] events of August 19" (the coup) and "continued ovations and praise in meetings with small groups as well as broader public appearances," and they planned to "develop material along same policy lines for immediate distribution Iran and media and for use by Department and USIA [United States information Agency] in [the] U. 108] The USIA asked to be provided with all "press materials supporting agreed themes for possible further exploitation U. Mosadeq" had an "attempted policy of open blackmail against the free world . (publisher of authors ranging from William Faulkner to D. Lawrence to Ayn Rand to Henry David Thoreau to Ian Fleming to Mickey Spillane) was an enthusiastic ally of the government (he had worked in a U. government propaganda office in Britain during World War II.) He visited the Middle East in 1951, and then reported to a State Department public affairs officer that "we are now working on a number of forthcoming books at the suggestion of . 36] Weybright was told, "certain projects aimed at stimulating the commercial distribution overseas of United States books constitute one approach to which we are devoting considerable attention and effort.This was a fundamental component of the decades-long U. 28] But suggestions that American propaganda should be distributed in the kingdom were viewed skeptically by U. These officers were the nucleus of what later became Ba'thist domination of Iraq's army.) (9) By 1954, however, the American embassy was expressing disappointment with the government of Iraq: "The constant hope of USIS officers that an indigenous distribution channel for non-attributed anti-Communist material could be opened with government help has never, until now, materialized." One problem was the government's view that the most effective way of spreading the anticommunist message was "to demonstrate its links with Israel and with world Zionism. also wanted Iranians to understand that it was necessary for the British-Iranian oil dispute to be settled on terms acceptable to the West: the article noted that "There seems to be a failure on the part of many of them to realize how necessary it is for them to stand behind their Government in a determined attempt to solve the most important problems of the country before the emergency aid which the United States has extended to Iran is exhausted." [Doc. to have decided he will accept long-standing British advice that he should have a British security expert to set up an anti-subversives department . For example, Ambassador to Iraq Burton Berry said in 1952 that "we, as propagandists, can only do our best to keep alive the hope in the Arab world that a political solution [to the Arab-Israeli dispute and continuing colonial interference by Britain and France] on the part of the United States is possible.S.-Saudi "special relationship." Britain created Iraq as a national state after World War I by consolidating several provinces of the collapsed Ottoman empire, and established a monarchy, the short-lived Iraqi Hashemite dynasty, by installing a World War I ally from Arabia to rule as a king amenable to British interests. Since support for Zionism is also linked in the public mind with the United States any such campaign creates a sort of neutralist 'plague on both your houses' attitude and could stir up increased enmity against the United States at the same time." However, the government provided "the only possible indigenous channels" for propaganda, and "All other channels must be opened and oiled by means not within the proper scope of USIS," so it, along with the embassy, decided to support the Iraqi campaign "by supplying raw material for the consideration of the committee and by such verbal advice on techniques as may seem appropriate. 114] (The collaboration of American media, including the Washington Post, the New York Times, Time, and Newsweek, with "the intelligence community" was discussed, post-Watergate scandal, in a report prepared by the congressional Church Committee and in more detail in a Rolling Stone article by Carl Bernstein.) (11) Press helpfulness is also illustrated by an incident involving Kuwait. consulate sources observed that there was "no evidence of increased Communist activity in Kuwait--or for that matter of any Communist activity" or any indication that any Kuwaitis had been to Vienna, or that there were any Kuwaiti unions. in that the [Kuwaiti] Director of Public Security appears to have been enough frightened . We can do this by emphasizing the growing interest in contemporary Middle East political problems on the part of Americans;" to do so he recommended "the channel to the activities of the American Friends of the Middle East [AFME]." [Doc.117] This message was considered especially important for the military sector: the NSC wanted to enhance "the understanding of the Army leadership [in the Middle East], and secondarily, the enlisted personnel towards the purpose of U. military aid as a factor in strengthening their national independence." [Doc. funded the display of posters at schools, shops, and other public buildings "sponsored by the Iranian Government and . 16] Brochures related parables, such as the illustrated story of "two young Iranian boys who are faced with the choice between communism . Franklin Roosevelt directed in 1945, the year of his famous meeting with Saudi Arabia's King Abd al-Aziz, that U. influence in the Middle East be expanded, and proposed, along with his wife Eleanor, that American films be shown in the region. Disney as a patriotic duty could be interested in preparing such a film that could be used to defend democracy where the communist system is being touted loudly." [Doc. Ambassador Loy Henderson felt that the Iranian government was insufficiently aware of the disapproval that the U. press was expressing regarding its policies, and suggested that the VOA transmit critical U. editorials (while also conveying the rather contradictory impression that the U. was "generally sympathetic with Iranian aspirations for full econ and polit independence.") He also wanted to have the VOA transmit programs to Iranians making "friendly ref to Shah as their progressive leader." [Doc. (Following this report, the aforementioned agency head requested that a messenger deliver future USIE scripts to him, without cover notes.) [Doc. to transfer as much as possible of info activities to friendly Iran Govt institutions." [Doc. engaged in activities contrary to [the] interests [of] Iran." [Doc. Support with factual coverage and moderate, selected comment Iran GOVT efforts to quell disorder and GOVT exposés of Tudeh COMMIE machinations." [Doc. induced to sponsor" various film titles, "as apart from direct USIS presentation. news media could be useful tools for both direct and indirect manipulation of opinion in Iran. 107] Demonstrating "the overwhelming and increasing industrial and military strength of the United States" was viewed as one way of increasing its influence. It was "assumed that such a visit would be undertaken only with an enthusiastic invitation from the Saudi Government." [Doc. 70] Since one aspect of the Cold War was competition between capitalism and communism as systems for achieving development and prosperity, scripts prepared by USIE for broadcast by Iran's Department of Press and Propaganda "did not neglect to present the result of the latest research in the United States and to make rather prominent mention of the country. So a brochure prepared for Iranian consumption, illustrated by a dancing bear, contrasted Soviet statements and its "youth demonstrations" with the accomplishments of the "Free World" and the United Nations, including assistance for health care, food and clothing distribution, and rehabilitation training. 96] Radio Baghdad broadcasts, of probable USIS origin, denied Communist claims of social equality and accused the Soviet Union of hypocrisy, charging that, despite its stated support for peace, it "mobilizes all its material power for war. He also planned the first publication in Saudi Arabia of the Koran, according to the State Department, and asked ARAMCO to get him radio broadcasting equipment.127] Unfortunately, observers friendly to the American government in the region noted that economic assistance was being characterized as an effort by "Western imperialists to buy friendship." [Doc. 4] In Iraq, embassy staff wrote their own cartoon script, featuring a scary symbolic bear menacing prehistoric humans. 41] During this crisis, the State Department was acutely aware of the potential for negative reaction to American propaganda. It is believed that the American Embassy has been paying sums of money to the Press and Propaganda Department with a view to using that Department as a means of propaganda for the United States." The head of the department was on the U. 47] Soon thereafter, the Iranian Interior Ministry ordered the closing of all information and cultural centers outside of Tehran, including those belonging to the USIE. it is our intention in case we do suspend activities . 49] An Iranian official expressed regret to the American embassy about the closings but said that "Some fo[reig]n cultural institutions in prov[ince]s had . 69] In May 1953, Ambassador Henderson was at pains to assure the State Department that his embassy was conducting an effective propaganda campaign: it compiled "a list of 260 articles, features, editorials and commentaries which ha[d] been placed in the local Tehran papers, as well as provincial papers, on anti-communist subjects." In addition, "Individual Iranian governmental offices are . As an example: 'Azerbaijan Day' [on the Russian occupation of a part of Iran following World War II] has been shown publicly both by the Ministry of Education and the imperial Iranian Gendarmerie while the Department of Propaganda has refused to take part in the sponsorship of the film." [Doc. The State Department suggested that it could seek "to inspire editorials or articles in U. publications which can be useful in case Embassy should desire certain points of view brought out for benefit American public . In October 1950, the ambassador to Iran suggested an emphasis in propaganda on the "quick overwhelming effectiveness U. This is also true of the present new industries series which have covered such things as plastics, rayon, diesel engines, chemurgy, frozen foods and fertilizer." [Doc. It produces atomic planes, heavy guns, and tanks, and mobilizes and trains the army in preparation for war, and spreads fear and horror among the peaceful nations." [Doc. on armed invasion of Egypt motivated by principles morality and justice . A department official was helpful: "It was pointed out to him" that he needed to get people used to tuning in.As the documents show, in some ways circumstances affecting propaganda during the 1950s were quite different than those of today, but many of the complexities that impeded U. Saudi Arabia had been established as a national state some 20 years before the time of these documents. 58] Official visits were recommended as a way to cultivate good will. An item broadcast by Radio Baghdad, of probable USIS origin, included praise for a Canadian "Association for Combating Communism" which had "foiled several Communist meetings in Montreal without enabling them to know any of the Association's members," adding that it would be "good to set up similar associations in all parts of the world." [Doc. home swiftly to Iraq" that its interests lay with the U. 62] One leaflet distributed by the embassy in Iran, entitled "Tale of the Beautiful Red Flower," contained an "allegory in which a red flower resembling the Venus Fly Trap symbolizes Soviet communism," showing how "lazy and frivolous bees are lured to destruction." The embassy was pleased with its impact, noting, "The text of this brochure has been picked up as an editorial by Iranian newspapers." [Doc. propaganda was identified by the American ambassador: "It appears that this material has the double objective of promoting and encouraging democratic government on the one hand while presenting the dangers of communism on the other. cooperated in disseminating propaganda, despite their divergent interests. USIS also indicated it would ask for a Fulbright-funded emissary to organize a student athletic program. 34] The initiative did not always come from the government: in early 1952, the American embassy in Iraq was intrigued by a U. graduate student's offer to survey public opinion among Iraqis.Tribal leader Abd al-Aziz had gained control of most of Arabia with the help of adherents of a militantly austere interpretation of Islam, Wahhabism. Saudi Arabia's defense minister was invited to the U. in 1951, in part because the State Department feared that the "untraveled, inexperienced, and impressionable young man" would be unduly influenced by an earlier trip to France. 122] The symbols considered useful for propaganda directed at the Middle East were intended to reflect well on American society, ridicule Communism and the Soviet Union, and encourage a belief in shared Western-Muslim values. S., the embassy planned to produce a map depicting Soviet expansionism that could be used on match books and other hand-outs, with a "red color to be watched closely to insure that it [did] not fade to pink or become muddy": it should be "hot . 96] Inter-government Collaboration American propaganda was created and disseminated with the knowledge and support of friendly foreign governments that identified their interests with the West. Since Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy its Government cannot be expected to welcome propaganda of the first category. Iraq helped the USIS in producing certain propaganda materials aimed at its Kurdish minority, including a bulletin, newsreels, and music broadcasts. 2] Other propaganda was targeted at the population at large: the American embassy was "informed privately and informally that the Government has no objection to the widespread distribution of anti-Communist material . (The agency thought diversion was called for: "students flock to coffee houses, political centers, and other places where the only recreation is political agitation.") The Iraqi education minister said he wanted a campaign to differentiate the students' "proper 'nationalist' demands" from Communism. The research would purportedly be independent, but would receive funding and be directed behind-the-scenes by the embassy's office of public affairs.Of the many responses of the Bush administration to the events of September 11, 2001, one of the most significant and most widely discussed was its intensified and greatly expanded propaganda program for the Middle East.Announced innovations have included the appointment of advertising executive Charlotte Beers to lead State Department efforts to win hearts and minds;(1) the establishment of a radio station to broadcast pop music, Eminem, and an American slant on the news to young listeners ; the creation of Arabic-language web sites; and the placement of U. government-sponsored commercials and advertisements in Middle Eastern media outlets.Despite rhetorical claims, influential Americans tolerated and valued authoritarian rule.The State Department said of American press views of the shah of Iran, "For a time, some hope was even expressed that he might assume personal leadership in Iran, possibly establishing military dictatorship in the fashion of Egypt's Naguib. The continuity which this form of Government gives, the absence of irresponsible electioneering, freedom from a local gutter press, and the non-existence of the more unpleasant aspects of nationalism are factors which greatly assist the conduct of our operations." (The writer was also concerned about the resistance of Kuwait's rulers to reform -- but only because this could ultimately undermine Western interests.) [Doc.